In breach of the 'overarching principle'. Judicial oversight of administrative decisions as a prerequisite for effective implementation of non-refoulement: Australia in focus. by Alexander, William
FACULTY OF LAW
University of Lund
William Alexander
In breach of the ‘overarching
principle.’ Judicial oversight of
administrative decisions as a
prerequisite for effective
implementation of non-
refoulement: Australia in focus.
Master thesis
20 points
Autumn 2002
Supervisor: Göran Melander
International Human Rights Law
Contents
SUMMARY 1
PREFACE 2
ABBREVIATIONS 3
1 SCOPE 4
2 PURPOSE 7
3 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY WITHIN AN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 9
4 JUDICIAL REVIEW AS OPINIO JURIS – STATE ADHERENCE
THROUGH OBLIGATION 11
5 THE PROHIBITION OF NON - REFOULEMENT – BEYOND
THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 14
6 THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR
HEARING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 18
Non-discrimination and equality before the law 18
Judicial review:  providing a right to an effective remedy 20
The application of the ‘overarching principle’ and the prohibition of refoulement 21
The scope of article 14 of the ICCPR - Resolving perceptions of ambiguity, under the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 22
State practice and the applicability of article 14 to administrative matters 24
Interpretation of article 14 extended by analogy 26
Non-discrimination – defining the Broader context 26
7 THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT 28
Scope of comparative analysis 28
The Rule of Law and judicial review 29
Judicial review of refugee determintion – Australia in focus 31
The inadequacy of unchecked administrative tribunals 31
The superiority of Judicial Reasoning 33
The jurisdiction of the Australian High court and Federal Court defined 34
The practice of judicial self restriant 35
Abebe and Eshetu – opinio juris without jurisdiction 36
In the absence of a bill of rights 37
A Constitutional prescription – the Canadian model 38
The current scope of judicial review under the Migration Act 40
The Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act  and the codification  of natural
justice / procedural fairness as opinio juris 41
Naturalism v Positivism - Implementation in deficit 43
CONCLUSION 47
TABLE OF CASES 49
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 50
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51
1Summary
In Australia, effective implementation of non-refoulement is assessed with
reference to conformity to an ‘overarching principle’ of international law defined
in the following terms: government decisions that potentially result in restrictions or
violations of human rights including persecution, torture, loss of life and liberty,
must always be subject to broad and effective judicial oversight.  Thus, in the
absence of judicial review effective implementation can not be ensured.
The right to adequate and effective judicial oversight, as a prerequisite for non-
refoulement, is discussed with reference to, and supported by all four sources of
international law including; ‘conventions,’ ‘international custom,’  ‘general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ and ‘judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.’ At the outset, however, Article
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights will be presented as
an adequate codification of the ‘overarching principle’ to include administrative
matters, and reinforced by the prohibition of discrimination. The psychological
commitment of all three streams of Australian government (the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary) to the ‘overarching principle’ is examined in
support of the customary international law. As a prerequisite for the effective
implementation of non-refoulement, substantive conformity to the ‘overarching
principle,’ it is argued, can be determined with reference to the extent to which
asylum seekers are discriminated against by virtue of their denial of the right to
effective judicial review, in relation to the rest of the Australian community.
With Australia in focus, uncertainties relating to uniformity of State practice will be
dispelled with reference to judicial power. Constitutional limits, as the case law
will illustrate, renders the judiciary hamstrung in its ability to adjudicate on non-
refoulement. In the face of legislative restrictions to their jurisdiction, it is
nevertheless encouraging that Australian superior courts have, contrary to
Constitutional convention, endeavoured to voice their frustration about a limited
human rights jurisdiction. Expressions of judicial frustration are thus regarded as
indicative of a psychological commitment, opinio juris, to the overarching
principle and human rights per se. Judicial power, in Australia, in the absence of
an entrenched bill of rights, will be further assessed in relation to the Canadian
experience. It is concluded, the immediate obligation to depart from discriminative
application of the ‘overarching principle’ in relation to the implementation of non-
refoulement, it will be established, rests clearly on the shoulders of the Executive
and Legislature.
2Preface
Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers in recent years has received much
attention from the world’s media, and for good reason. The current Liberal
(conservative) government’s treatment of asylum seekers has been nothing short
of deplorable. Such policies include, but are not limited to, indefinite arbitrary
detention of asylum seekers, denied access to basic welfare rights and, as is the
focus of this paper, inadequate and discriminative access to the administration of
justice eventuating in violations of the peremptory norm of non-refoulement.
Although all such issues are of profound significance, the methodology of this
paper was premised on the necessity to prioritise human rights violations and
focus on the effective implementation of non-refoulement.
Furthermore, it must be said that this thesis does not discover anything new.
Rather, by stating the obvious, I have endeavoured to examine domestic non-
compliance to the peremptory norm of non-refoulement. In doing so, the
methodology employed, it should be acknowledged, owes much to the
encouraging words of Professor Rahmatulla Khan, without whom the
conceptualisation of the ‘overarching principle’ would most probably not have
eventuated. Thanks go also to Professor Göran Melander, for his supervision,
and to Brian Burdekin for his thoughts on refugee issues in the international
context.
3Abbreviations
CAT            Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
                    Degrading Treatment or Punishment
ADJR         Australian Administrative Appeals Judicial Review Act
CRC           Convention on the Rights of the Child
ECHR         European Convention of Human Rights
ECtHR        European Court of Human Rights
HRC           United Nations Human Rights Committee
ICJ              International Court of Justice
RRT            Australian Refugee Review Tribunal
VCLT         Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
UDHR        Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNHCR     United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
41 Scope
With Australia in focus, the purpose of this paper is to examine the domestic
implementation of the broadly codified ‘overarching principle’ (hereafter referred)
of the right to broad and effective judicial oversight of all matters involving
potential violations of human rights. Moreover, the ‘overarching principle,’
regardless of any prevailing perceptions of ambiguity, extends to decisions
beyond criminal matters to include the implementation of non-refoulement.
Furthermore, it is argued that it is not only obligatory for States to provide
adequate judicial review over administrative decision-making processes
supposedly implementing non-refoulement obligations under the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), but similar
obligations arise also under; the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the
Convention against Torture (CAT). With support from the sources of international
law, at the outset, the ‘overarching principle’ pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, will be held as an adequately codified right to
a fair trail under Article 14 of the ICCPR.1
The necessity to support a proper interpretation of Article 14 of the ICCPR,
moreover, it should be emphasised, arises from the necessity to counteract
widespread and discriminative state implementation of the ‘overarching principle’
worldwide. For as long as the outsider/insider dichotomy prevails as an
unwarranted justification for a discriminative application of the right to a fair
hearing, to the exclusion of asylum seekers and so-called illegal immigrants, there
remains the need to re-emphasise State obligations to citizens and non-citizens
alike. This, after all, is exactly what the legal and democratic principle of ‘equality
before the law’ and complementary prohibition of non-discrimination demands.2
As a prelude to the peremptory norm of non-discrimination, Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that “[a]ll human beings are born
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
                                                
1 As both Art 14 of the ICCPR and Art 6 of the ECHR are in substance fundamentally
similar, it is therefore unproblematic to utilise ECtHR jurisprudence as a supplement in
support of Human Rights Committee jurisprudence.
2 The principle of equality may be regarded as both a fundamental principle ‘imbuing and
inspiring the concept of human rights’ and a cornerstone of modern democracy. See,
Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary.,N.P.Engel, 1993, pp 458-459; In the Anglo- American legal tradition, the
importance of the separation of judicial power is premised on the need for equality before
the law. See Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law: Eighth Edition, Oxford University press, 2000,
p21-23
5should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”3 In light of
discriminative policies based on the rational of a insider/outsider dichotomy,4
sovereignty based arguments cannot be regarded as a legitimate justification for
systemic violations of the peremptory norm of non-discrimination, especially
considering the violations ultimately lead to a consequential violations of non-
refoulement. Thus, especially in light of what is potentially at stake for the
applicant, under no circumstances can it be legitimate to exclude non-citizens from
the ‘right to a fair hearing.’ Pursuant to Article 14, ‘all persons’ are ‘equal before
the courts and tribunals’ in matters determining ‘rights and obligations in a suit at
law.’
At the outset, a universal and non-discriminative application of Article 14 must be
emphasised.5 To further establish a purposive interpretation of Article 14, and in
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the
discussion will inevitably support the ‘overarching principle’ as customary
international law. While the implementation of non-refoulement in Australia, will
provide a benchmark of analysis, material evidence will be drawn from other
domestic jurisdictions to support the customary elements of ‘widespread
uniformity of practice’ and ‘opinio juris.’
Reference will also be made to ‘general principles of the civilised nations.’
Indeed, both individually and collectively, all four sources of international law
under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute may be utilised to support the ‘overarching
principle.’ Moreover, by way of interaction, each sub-section of Art 38 will thus
serve to support the other.6 Hence, the process of treaty interpretation against a
contextual backdrop made up of, and supported by, all four sources of
international law, will include:‘…(a) international conventions,… (b) international
custom,…(c) general principles of law recognised by civilised nations...[and] (d)
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists…’
As a vital safeguard against non-refoulement, judicial review, in Australia,
prevails formally albeit in a restrictive sense in spite of comprehensive and
                                                
3 The normative validity of Art 1 is supported by classical predecessor texts in the Western
tradition. See Tore Lindholm on Art 1.  in, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – A
Common Standard of Achievement, Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide (eds), Martinus
Hijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999, p 41
4 The term is conceptualised in David Biale, Michael Galchinsky, and Susannah Heschel, editors
Insider/Outsider - American Jews and Multiculturalism, the University of California Press, 1998
5 Art 2 ICCPR ensures ‘all individuals’ with the territory of the nation-state are protected
without distinction ‘of any kind.’
6 Article 38 of the ICCPR constitutes the most legitimate list of sources of international law.
Moreover there is nothing to suggest that the list is fundamentally hierarchical. Whist
treaties and custom may hold equal weight, general principle can serve as a gap filler. See,
Peter Malamczuk, Akehurst’s – Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised
edition, Routledge, London, 1997, pp 36, 56-57
6systemic legislative efforts undermining its effectiveness. As will be discussed
below, in support of the customary element of opinio juris, the Federal Court of
Australia’s limited jurisdiction over refugee determination is indicative the state’s
psychological commitment to project the image that justice is being done.
Amongst other things, it is this ‘state practice’ of setting up elaborate, although
defective, refugee determination systems, coupled with a degree of formal
adherence to the rule of law, that supports the ‘overarching principle’ as
customary international law. Moreover, with few exceptions, the same can be
said of determination systems in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and through out much of the developed world.
Hence the failure to provide asylum seekers with access to adequate judicial
review does not constitute legitimate state practice. Rather this differential
treatment of asylum seekers, illuminated within the context of a functional
democratic state subject to rule of law, is indicative of a wide spread uniformity of
discriminative conduct. It must be emphasised, therefore,  such treatment asylum
seekers is discriminative conduct, not by omission but by a positive act,
perpetuated through inadequate and widespread implementation. Thus, the
discriminative conduct should not merely be seen as a facilitator of  non-
refoulement, but indeed, a violation of a peremptory norm systemically
perpetuated by legislative means.
72 Purpose
Throughout the international community there prevails serious and widespread
violations of the peremptory norms of international human rights law. As
discrimination continues to permeate societies in an array of forms, similarly,
claims by governments that deny violations of the prohibition of torture should be
taken with a grain of salt.  Alarmingly, the codified right to a fair hearing is violated
by way of a discriminative application to asylum seekers and those seeking
protection against refoulement per se. Apart from the broad base codification of
the prohibition of discrimination by a plethora of international instruments,7 Article
6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)8 codifies the principle of
non-discrimination in the following terms:
All are equal be for the law and are entitled without discrimination to equal
protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration and against
any incitement to such discrimination’
To evaluate widespread discrimination, it is therefore necessary therefore to
counter sovereignty based arguments that would seek to justify departure from
the obligation to provide all human beings, residing within the domestic jurisdiction
of States, subject to the appropriate application of the derogation clause,9 the
right to a fair and public hearing before an independent court. Considering that
violations of the right to a hearing, in relation to the implementation of non-
refoulement, are inseparable and interrelated to potential restrictions to human
rights of the most serious kind (ranging from mere persecution to violations of the
rights to life); it is vital that all human beings within the jurisdiction of the state are
protected through a non-discriminative implementation of Article 14 of the
                                                
7 International instruments that codify the prohibition of discrimination include: Art. 2
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Arts. 2 and 6 of
the ICCPR; the Convention on the elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (1979); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1965); Art. 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); Art. 1 of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1975)
8 As a declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights may be regarded as customary international law to the extend
that it is regarded as an expression of a consensus of the international community.
9 Whilst Article 6 ICCPR permits States to derogate from obligations relating to article 14
(fair trial), this margin of appreciation only applies ‘in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation’. These, ‘measures’ that are ‘required by the exigencies of the
situation’ and are not inconsistence with other obligations under international law including
discrimination.
8ICCPR. Indeed, there can be no justification for inadequate domestic
determination systems that fail to protect against refoulement.10
To gain an appreciation of the inadequacy of domestic implementation of non-
refoulement, one only need compare the checks and balances contained in the
Victorian Crimes Act11 and the facilitation of criminal procedure under the rule
of law, against the pitiful processes regulating refugee and humanitarian
applications pursuant to the Australian Migration Act. It is worth noting, in full
compliance with the ICCPR, criminal procedure in Victoria provides a full gamete
of guarantees for accused persons, underpinned by the presumption of innocence
and the rule of law. The Migration Act, on the other hand, fails to provide any
equivalent standards under Article 14 of the ICCPR.
Unlike individuals undergoing criminal prosecution in Australia, asylum seekers do
not receive a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Rather, in the absence of adequate and effective judicial oversight, the
determination process operates substantially within the executive stream of
government, substantially outside the checks and balances provided under the rule
of law. As will be discussed below, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal
(RRT) is not in any sense an independent court. Without judicial mandate, it is but
an administrative decision making body, with decision-makers who do not hold
tenure to guarantee their independence and who are not required to possess legal
qualifications.
Although the refugee determination in Australia is far from exceptional as an
exemplification of a relatively unchecked administrative decision-making process,
it may be regarded nevertheless as an exemplification of the administration of
justice gone bad. Since 1992, both the Labor (left) government and, since 1996
the Liberal (conservative) government have introduced legislative changes that
have perpetuated departure from Australia’s obligations under Article 14 of the
ICCPR and moreover the implementation of non-refoulement. As will be
discussed below, in the absence of a bill of rights, the High Court, and to a
greater extent, the Federal Court remain hamstrung in their ability to counteract
this intrusive narrowing if its jurisdiction by the substantial removal of the common
law grounds of appeal. Currently, appeals to the Federal Court are limited to the
grounds of ‘errors of law’ and ‘bias,’ making it near impossible for the vast
majority of asylum seekers to access judicial review.12
                                                
10 As the cornerstone of the prohibition of torture, non-refoulement has now the status of
jus cogens, from which no degrogation is permitted. See International Journal of refugee
law, Vol 13, Issue 4, pp 533-558
11 Section 464: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), provides relatively comprehensive standards to be
adhered to by police regarding to collection of evidence.
12 See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Part 8
9With the Australian refugee determination system as a model of analysis, it will be
argued that a non-discriminative implementation of Article 14 of the ICCPR is
integral the implementation of non-refoulement. In support of this thesis,
reference will be made to High Court and Federal Court case law and the
reasoning of the RRT. Furthermore, as a means to assess the adequacy of
unchecked administrative determination within a global context, and in support of
the ‘overarching principle’, the Australian experience will, to some extent, be
placed within an international context with reference to other domestic
jurisdictions where appropriate.
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3 Australian government policy
within an historical context
When the founding fathers drafted the Australian Constitution at the turn of the
twentieth Century, Australia as a British colony had a long history of both
domestic and foreign policy based on discrimination. Beyond genocidal racist
domestic policies designed to breed out the indigenous population,13 the former
colony’s migration policies had focused primarily at excluding non-western
European immigration.14
The founding fathers had drafted s117 of the Constitution to remove references to
‘equality before the law’ and equal application of laws to ensure that prevailing
racist colonial legislation would remain constitutionally valid. As it stood, until its
amendment in 1967, s51(xxvi) of the Constitution had empowered the Federal
Parliament to make laws with respect to: “[t]he people of any race, other that
the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make
special laws”. In 1967 the word in italics were deleted.
It was not until the advent of the Whitlam Labor government in 1973, that it could
be said the ‘White Australia Policy,’ at least in an informal sense, had finally come
to an end.15 By 1975,  a new migration policy of inclusion and non-discrimination,
coinciding with the fall of Saigon, promoted and complemented public sympathy
for ‘boat people,’ who, deserved of compassion, were seen to have bravely
reached ‘the lucky country’16in leaky boats. Political correctness, henceforth,
demanded that refugees where treated as new Australians deserved of public care
and social tolerance. Those with the courage to reach ‘the lucky country’ through
perilous waters, were deemed worthy of her protection.
                                                
13 For example, the Aborigines Protection Act 1886 (Vic) was designed to facilitate forced
assimilation of Aboriginals into white society. See Nick O’Neal & Robin Handley, Retreat
From Injustice – Human Rights in Australian Law, Federation Press, Leichhardt, New
South Wales, 1994, p 395; See generally, ‘Bringing them home’ - A guide to the findings
and recommendations of the National Inquiry into the separation of the Aboriginal and
Torres Straight Islander children from their families, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission 1997
14 Nick O’Neal & Robin Handley, op cit, pp 472-473
15  In 1901 Alfred Deakin, one of the founding fathers, stated:  “The ultimate result is a
national determination to make no truce with coloured immigration, to have no traffic with
the unclean thing, and to put it down in all its shapes without much regard to cost. Those
Chinese, Japanese, or coolies who have come here under the law, in spite of it, are not
permitted to increase.”  See, Nick O’Neal & Robin Handley, op cit, pp 472-473
16 The term originated from the economic prosperity of the 1970’s. It was also used in
government advertising campaigns to reassure new arrivals.
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By the late 1980’s, tolerance, compassion and goodwill were dwindling.17 It
seemed that the representative government and its constituency were suffering
tolerance fatigue. At the beginning of the 1990’s with the economy in serious
recession, the migration policy had completed its about face. It had become once
against exclusionist. Refugee determination had become viewed by the Federal
government as an impediment to effective migration control.18 Indicative of the
new migration policy, in 1994 the Migration Act was amended to restrict judicial
review by the Federal Court over administrative refugee determination.19 By 1996
the grounds for judicial review available to asylum seekers were further reduced
to ‘error of law’ and ‘bias’ thereby making access to the court near impossible
for the vast majority of refugees. In 2001 further amendments to the Migration
Act included the introduction of a privative clause intended of preclude specific
categories of individuals from judicial review entirely.20
Disturbingly, the present Australian government has clearly evinced a complete
and utter disregard for Australia’s obligations under international law, not only
through its public statements, but moreover, though further regressive legislative
change. The current situation is simply this: Refugees are now treated as illegal
aliens, undeserved of the basic and fundamental protection against gross violations
of human rights ranging from persecution to torture and murder. As a
consequence, the most fundamental of Australia’s extra-territorial human rights
obligations - the implementation of non-refoulement - is now rendered utterly
ineffective by virtue of the discriminatory exclusion of asylum seekers from the
right to judicial review.
                                                
17 By 1989 it had become public knowledge that asylum seekers were being arbitrarily
detained in detention centres in less than adequate conditions. See Andrew Hamilton,
“Three Years Land”, Eureka Street, Vol 3, No 1, Feb 1993, 24-23 and Vol 3, No 2, March
1993, 22-28; O’Neal & Handley, op cit, 488
18 The 1994 amendments were a consequence of the governments view that the judiciary
was undermining exclusionist immigration policy through comprehensive judicial review
powers. See Mary Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, 1998,  p290-291
19 Ibid
20 In 2001 a privative clause introduced, for example, ‘temporary protection visas,’ which are
not subject to judicial review. See s464 Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
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4 Judicial review as opinio
juris – State adherence through
obligation
It is significant therefore that the principle of sovereignty is being increasingly cited
by governments to justify blatant discrimination against non-citizens, many of
whom, pursuant to the Refugee Convention, face a real risk of persecution.21 In
the light of a general ‘overarching principle’, focus will be paid to reasons and
implications relating to State departure from the obligation of non-refoulement.
With governments seeking to restrict the rights of asylum seekers, human rights
violations of non-citizens are unjustifiably based on the rationale of State
sovereignty and the insider/outsider dichotomy. Ironically, however, as states
seek to exploit a perceived margin of appreciation regarding the implementation
of refugee determination, simultaneously they exhibit a clear reluctance to depart
completely from administrative law principles of natural justice that are firmly
embedded in liberal traditions of the rule of law and the separation of powers. An
upshot of this is that such conformity evidences adherence to the psychological
element of opinio juris under customary international law. Moreover, a dilemma
prevails for governments whose domestic policies embrace the rhetoric of liberal
democracy and constitutional legitimacy, but simultaneously, and with a seemingly
ruthless rectitude, continue to utilise xenophobic propaganda as a justification for
departure from human rights obligations for their own political ends.22
Such policies are clearly indicative of a dangerous trend immerging though out the
developed world. Notably, the conservative governments of Australia and
Denmark have exhibited a propensity to exploit the lowest electoral common
denominator of xenophobic sentiment through rhetorical scape-goating.23
                                                
21 See, Susan Kneebone, Refugees, Natural Justice and Sovereignty: Fundamental or
Substantial Justice, www.eur.nl/frg/iacl/papers/Kneebone.html, p 1
22 The Australian government has exhibited a propensity for perpetuating the myth of
refugees as opportunistic ‘queue jumpers’. Australia's Immigration Minister, Phillip
Ruddock, has frequently claimed that people arriving in Australia to claim asylum are
jumping a queue and unfairly taking the place of other refugees who have to wait in line. He
stated, "Every time someone who has the resources to pay people smugglers arrives
unlawfully in Australia and is granted refugee status, a place is denied to someone else
languishing in the most undesirable circumstances." World Refugee Day Statement from
Minister for Immigration, Phillip Ruddock, June 20, 2000
23 In Denmark the DPP evidently exploited the xenophobic sentiment of the electorate
shortly after September 11 in its election campaign.  "All Western countries have been
infiltrated by Muslims, some of whom are polite to us while waiting until there's enough of
them to get rid of us." And although the DPP led the rhetorical assault, Denmark's political
mainstream soon followed, both in public statements and in campaign advertising. See
Sasha Polakow-Suranski, Fortress Denmark , 2002, www.project.org/print/v13/10/polakow-
suransky.html
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Nevertheless, in accordance with the liberal tradition, and in spite of such tactics,
the Australian legal system continues to maintain a superficial adherence to the
principle of non-refoulement. The Australian refugee determination process
maintains at its pinnacle, judicial review over administrative decisions, limited
albeit by an ‘error of law’. The maintenance of judicial review, therefore, although
substantially ineffective, is nonetheless indicative of the State’s obligatory
adherence to liberalism and the rule of law. Put simply, governments, regardless
of their xenophobic and discriminative tendencies, endeavour to project a
superficial impression of adherence to the ‘overarching principle’ albeit through
legislative and/or policy based conformity.
In Australia, the legal tradition of maintaining judicial review over administrative
decisions is supported by a range of material evidence. From above, the
Australian Constitution sets the scope of High Court’s original or residual
jurisdiction, which includes ‘all matters … arising under any treaty...[and]…in
which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an
officer of the Commonwealth’24 The High Court thus maintains an entrenched
jurisdiction over non-refoulement determination made under the Migration Act
which, with a degree of noted inherent uncertainty, extends to ‘Convention
Refugees.’25 This constitutional entrenchment of judicial review over
administrative decisions thus serves as both evidence of ‘general principles of law’
and opinio juris under customary international law. Thus, whilst the Parliament
can (and has) profoundly restricted the delegated jurisdiction of the Federal Court
to errors of law, its formal jurisdiction nonetheless prevails to further evidence
the ‘overarching principle.’ Moreover, although the formal existence and scope of
judicial review of refugee determination remains an ineffective implementation of
non-refoulement, it does however provide material evidence of customary
international law.
In spite of the recalcitrant statements by the Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, Philip Rudduck, regarding Australia’s obligation under the
Refugee Convention, the formal availability of judicial review derived from both
constitutional entitlement and parliamentary sovereignty, serves to support, at the
very least, a clear inference of opinio juris. The conduct of the parliament in
tolerating a Federal Court jurisdiction over refugee determination, albeit
                                                
24 Section 75 of the Constitution of Australia
25 Section 32 (2) states “a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant…is a non-citizen
…to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention as amended
by the Refugees Protocol.” It is reasonable to suggest, however, that section 29 with the
words ‘may be given visa’ creates a degree of certainty, which undermines the absolute
prohibition of non-refoulement. See, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee: Enquiry into Australia’s Refugee Determination Program, Senate
Committee, June 1999, pp 50-51
14
restrictive, ‘is evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
evidence of the rule of law requiring it.’26
Regrettably, however, in the area of refugee determination, the rule of law is
squeezed far and beyond its effective limits. Indicative of the discriminative
disregard for the human rights of asylum seekers prevailing in Australia, beyond
the pale, administrative decisions over refugee determination sit outside the
protective shadow of effective judicial oversight, receiving little shade from the
burning rays of refoulement. Suffice to say, any lack of adjudicative shade may
therefore be regarded as determinative of the extent to which ‘the overarching
principle’ is breached.
                                                
26 Nicaragua v The United States (Merits) Case ICJ 1986, 14;  Ian Brownlie, Principles of
International Law, 5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p 4
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5 The prohibition of non -
refoulement – Beyond the
Refugee Convention
Throughout the international community there has emerged a consensus of
discontent regarding the Refugee Convention and its applicability within a modern
context. Much of the criticism is based on the pretext that the Convention is
anachronistic, as it was drafted as a remedial measure to deal with the mass-
exodus of Europeans during and after World War II. It has bean suggested,
moreover, that its incompatibility with an era of globalisation characterised by
mass refugee outflows or migration.27 UK home secretary, Jack Straw, and the
Australian Immigration Minister, Phillip Rudduck, for example, have criticised the
Refugee Convention as an irrelevant and unworkable instrument.28 Such views
emphasise the importance of controlling of refugee flows over the priority of
‘protection’.
However such alarmist views are less than convincing. For it is not refugee law
that is inherently problematic, rather, it is State adherence to refugee law that is in
crisis.  Such statements, therefore, must be seen for what they are; state-centric
attempts to devalue the primary importance of non-refoulement, which as a
peremptory norm prevails regardless of the perceived vagaries of the Refugee
Convention. In her paper entitled: ‘The Problem with the refugee Convention’,
Adrienne Millbank suggests that the 14 million dollars annually spent on the RRT
(an amount equivalent to the Australia’s annual commitment to UNHCR)29 is
indicative of a determination system under pressure. Here it is argued that the
inadequacies of refugee determination systems in Australia and the United
Kingdom are symptomatic of the inadequacy of the Refugee Convention. This
view is however problematic given the broad discretion exercised by states in the
implementation of Convention obligations,30and their evinced propensity for
restrictive interpretation. In Chen Shi Hai v the Minister for Immigration and
                                                
27 Adrienne Millbank, The problem with the Refugee Convention, Research Paper 5 2000-
01, Parliament of Australia: Department of then Parliament Library.
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
30 In May the UN Committee against Torture asked the government not to return a rejected
asylum-seeker to Somalia where he risked torture. The government disputed the Committee's
authority over the case partly on the grounds that in the absence of a central government in
Somalia, there were no officials who could inflict torture. After 27 months in detention, the
asylum-seeker was still awaiting a final decision about his status at the end of 1999.  Amnesty
International, International Report 2000 – Australia
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Multicultural Affairs,31 for example, the High Court held that ‘black children’
born in contravention of China’s ‘one child policy’, contrary to the RRT’s
restrictive interpretation, constitute a particular ‘social group’ under the Refugee
Convention and, furthermore, would suffer persecution by virtue of that
membership. The ratio decidendi in Chen Shi Hai thus demonstrates the
applicability of the Convention definition of ‘refugee’ to a modern context, which
was in stark contrast to the restrictive approach of administrative
determination32exhibited by the RRT.
Moreover, it should be emphasised that these elaborate determination systems
grant only a small fraction of applicants refugee status.33 Indeed, it has become
clearly apparent that the Convention’s cornerstone of non-refoulement has been
undermined by the pre-eminence of migration control. Thus domestic refugee
policy may properly be regarded as less to do with State obligations under
international human rights law, but rather, more to do with governments’
propensity to set a discourse that undermines the legitimate pre-eminence of non-
refoulement.
As Stated above, the prohibition of non-refoulement extends beyond the
Refugee Convention. Under the Refugee Convention a ‘refugee’ is an individual
who, ‘owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unable to avail himself [or herself] to the protection of that country.’34 Although
not prescriptive, the Refugee Convention provides a refugee definition devise by
which to implement non-refoulement. As such, it serves to underpin state
obligations to protect individuals from human rights abuses in other states.
The perceived margin of appreciation, it is suggested, owes much to an isolated
interpretation of the Refugee Convention arguable at the of the obligation of non-
refoulement more broadly. For example, James C. Hathaway, amongst others,
exhibit a preoccupation with emphasising the pre-eminence of refugee status
under the Refugee Convention. Moreover, by placing doubt on the status of non-
refoulement as customary international law through suggesting a lack of
uniformity of practice,35Hathaway arguably contributes to the promotion of a non-
                                                
31 [2000] HCA 19 [13 April 2000]; It was reported that the RRT held that the “applicant faces
a real chance of persecution because of (in a strict conservative sense) his membership of a
particular social group, but not for reasons of membership of that group” because
consequences suffered would not “result from any malignity or enmity or adverse intent
toward him on part of the authorities”
32 See generally, Heaven Crawley, ‘Reconciling universal human rights and cultural
relativism’, in Refugees and Gender: Law and Process, Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 2001
33 In recent years, in Canada 60% of claimants have succeeded, compared with 25% in
Australia. See Kneebone, op cit, p 1
34 See Art. 1(2) Refugee Convention 1951
35  James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Vancouver, 2001,  pp 25-27
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contextual and restrictive interpretation of the Refugee Convention. It is argued
however that regardless of the over-elevated debate, for example surrounding the
ambit of the enumerated persecution grounds,36 a purposive interpretation must
prevail to reinforce the primary obligation to protect against ‘persecution.’ As
their honours demonstrated above in Chen Shi Hai, any ambiguity imputed from
the enumeration of persecution grounds, may be rectified by a purposive and
contextual interpretation carried out in good faith.
In the absence of a prescription for refugee determination, administrative
determination systems vary from state to state. Canada provides for example
relatively broad grounds for judicial review, whilst in Sweden, with the Aliens
Appeals Board as the final appeal forum; there is no prospect of appeal to an
independent court.37  It is argued, however, that the legitimate scope of margin of
appreciation under international law, does not permit the preclusion of adequate
and effective judicial oversight of refugee determination and the implementation of
non-refoulement. Moreover, the implementation of non-refoulement is not
solely dependent on the refugee Convention, but, more broadly, extends to the
facilitation of non-refoulement in conformity with the ‘overarching principle.’
As Article 31 of the VCLT stipulates, ambiguity must be interpreted with
reference to the broader context. Thus, in Australia today, implementation of the
Refugee Convention is carried out in breach of other codified and customary
principles of international law including the right to a fair hearing and non-
discrimination.  In the light of the increasing propensity of governments to retreat
from their responsibilities to refugees, politicised and non-independent tribunals
cannot be relied upon to implement obligations reasonably, in good faith and in
accordance with international standard and the rule of law. Furthermore, as
Justice North of the Federal Court of Australia has emphasised:
In the context where the Executive or Legislature resists the implementation of
refugee law in good faith, international refugee jurisprudence true to the object
and purpose of the Convention will only emerge if the asylum adjudicators are
formally independent and independently minded….38
Moreover, considering the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees(UNHCR) has expressed the view that the emergence of international
refugee jurisprudence remains dependent on national courts and legal systems,
logically, without judicial oversight, jurisprudence will continue to remain
                                                
36  James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Vancouver, 2001,  pp 25-27
37 See pamflet by Migrationverket (Swedish Migration Department) , Immigration controls,
December, 2000
38 Justice A. M. North – ‘The Role of the Judge’,  15  Georgetown Immigration Law Journal
479 at 485
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underdeveloped,39thereby hindering the proper interpretation and application of
the Convention.
The role of the domestic courts is thus integral to a progressive development of
refugee law jurisprudence. Because of their constitutional independence, it is only
courts can be relied upon to give priority to the necessity of adherence to human
rights. In the English case of Ex parte Shah,  the Court observed the necessity of
expertise and multi-skilled competence:
In this highly specialised field of adjudication, a great deal depends upon the
expertise of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal itself. Its adjudication is not a
conventional lawyers exercise of applying a legal litmus test to ascertained facts,
it is a global appraisal of an individual’s past and prospective situation in a
particular cultural, social, political and legal milieu, judged by a test which, though
it has legal and linguistic limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.40
In a similar vein Kirby J. in Chen Shi Hai stated:
Whilst the courts of law, tribunals and officials must uphold the law, they must
approach the meaning of the law relating to refugees with its humanitarian
purpose in mind. The Convention was adopted by the international community,
and passed into Australian domestic law, to prevent the repetition of the affronts
to humanity that occurred in the middle of the twentieth century and earlier. At
that time Australia, like most other like countries, substantially closed its doors
against refugees. The Convention and the municipal law giving it affect, are
designed to ensure that this mistake is not repeated.41
As an exemplification of the commitment to the facilitation of human rights, by
ensuring that a purposive interpretation of the Refugee convention prevails, their
honours exemplify the vitality of judicial independence to ensure the Refugee
Convention’s ‘humanitarian purpose’ predominates.
Considering the tension between executive migration policies that historically have
been characterised by racism and xenophobia, an undeniable need prevails for
judicial oversight to stem the utilitarian excesses that serve to undermine the rule
of law in a human rights based democracy. In a country such as Australia where
the ‘white Australia policy’ prevailed until 1972, indeed, the sanctity and mandate
of the judiciary must suffice at a time when compassion for refugees is dwindling
though out the world.  When Izlamaphobia is rife, judicial oversight must remain a
                                                
39 Erika Feller, The Role of Adjudicators and Judges in International Refugee Protection, in,
Selected Papers Presented at the October, 2000 Conference of the International Association
of Refugee Law Judges at Bern, Switzerland: The Future of Protection, Justice A. M. North,
Federal Court of Australia – ‘ The Role of the Judge’ 15 Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal 479 at 485
40 R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary of State fro the Home Department ex
parte Shah, [1997] Imm. A. R. 145, 153
41 Ibid, para 47
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prerequisite to insure proper and just implementation of the Refugee Convention,
necessarily operative within the context of liberal democracy and the rule of law.
There is, after all, nothing exceptional about refugees. The rule of law must apply
to all. The modern democratic nation-state is indeed only democratic to the extent
that it facilitates the rights of all human beings within its jurisdiction. With
independent judicial oversight vital to non-refoulement determination, anything
less must therefore constitute a regressive adherence to nineteenth century
Bentham-style utilitarianism.42
                                                
42 Jeremy Bentham espoused the notion of utilitarianism, that is, the notion that democracy
is functional if the greater good for the greater number is protected.
20
6 The scope and application of
the right to a fair hearing under
international law
Non-discrimination and equality before the law
The prohibition of non-discrimination and the principle of equality, as stated
above, enjoys a wide spread uniformity of codification both domestically and
internationally.  Australia, for example, is unexceptional in taking positive
measures through the implementation of domestic legislation with the intention of
comprehensively prohibiting discrimination through criminal sanctions and other
anti-discrimination measures.43
The obligation of the Australian executive and legislature to implement the
prohibition of discrimination, exists not merely as a non-derogatable principle of
international law, but moreover, the common law principle of equality has existed
in perpetuity; fundamentally linked to the democratic system and the rule of law.
The principle of equality, as Wade and Forsyth explain, is dependent on the
existence of an independent judiciary. “The right to carry a dispute with the
government before the ordinary courts, manned by judges of the highest
independence, is an important element in the Anglo-American concept of the rule
of law.”44
With regard to international law, Nowak suggests that both interrelated principles
(equality and non-discrimination) ‘run like a thread throughout the Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights.’45 In relation to Article 14 of the ICCPR, according to
Nowak :
The right to equality before the court goes beyond equality before the law,
referring to the specific application of laws by the judiciary. It is to be read in
conjunction with the general prohibition of discrimination under Art 2(1). This
means that all persons must be granted, without distinction as to race, religion,
sex, property, etc., a right to equal access to a court.46
State parties are moreover obliged under Art. 2(1) to ensure, without
discrimination, that the rights of the Covenant apply to all individuals within their
                                                
43 See generally, Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Racial Hatred Act 1975 (Cth)
44 Wade & Forsyth,  Administrative Law: Eighth Edition, Oxford University press, 2000
 p22
45 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary.,
N.P.Engel, 1993,  p 239
46 Ibid
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territorial jurisdiction, without exception. Thus, State parties are obliged to ensure
that the right to a fair hearing receives a non-discrimiantive application in the sence
that it applies to everyone, citizen and non-citizen alike.
Under Article 26 of the ICCPR, “[A]ll persons are … entitled without
discrimination to equal protection of the law.” This includes, more specifically, an
obligation on behalf of the Legislature to ensure that legislative initiatives do not
discriminate against any individuals, including refugee applicants.47 The
inadequacy of judicial oversight over refugee determination under the Migration
Act, must therefore be regarded as an exemplification of a failure by the Federal
Legislature to facilitate the effective right to a fair hearing. However, through
ongoing legislative amendments to the Migration Act since 1992, both Labor and
Liberal governments have initiated deliberate and systematic discrimination against
refugee applicants, as the grounds of appeal to the Federal Court have been
increasingly narrowed.
The Australian Legislature provides the Federal Court with a general jurisdiction
over administrative matters.48 The Federal Court’s jurisdiction is therefore defined
by common law grounds of which include; error of law, bias, right to a hearing,
unreasonableness and irrelevant/relevant considerations. These components that
constitute the doctrines of ultra vires and natural justice, moreover, are widely
regarded as essential to the operation of effective judicial review over
administrative decision-making.49 This was, after all, the intention of the Federal
Parliament in introducing the Administrative Decisions Judicial review Act 1977.50
Thus, as a basis to ensure a non-discriminative application of the ‘overarching
principle,’ the widely codified norm of ‘equality before the law’51 ensures
protection for all human beings within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. It is
here that the absence of an express provision of judicial review for asylum
seekers in international law, it is argued, should not preclude the extension of the
‘overarching principle’ to applicants seeking redress against persecution under
domestic administrative law. After all, what matters is the potential loss of life and
liberty. Whilst the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence does not support a
right to judicial review in all circumstances,52 it has never, however expressly
precluded the right to judicial review of administrative determination of non-
refoulement. To reiterate, in refugee determination matters it should be
                                                
47 Ibid,. p 468
48 In 1980 the Administrative Decision Judicial Review Act 1977 extended and defined the
existing judicial review powers of the Federal Court; See Crock, op cit, p196
49 See generally, Douglas & Jones, op cit,  pp257-297
50 See Mary E Crock, op cit, p 195
51 Provide examples of ‘equality before the law’ in treaties (Non-discrimination as Jus
Cogens) and broad codification in 5 major treaties
52 I.P. v Finland, Human Rights Committee Communication No 450/1991: Finland. 26/09/93.
CCPR/C/48/D/450/1991. Here the HRC held that there was not absolute right of judicial
review over administrative determination of a taxation matter.
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considered that it is the potential risk of being sent back to ones country of origin
to be subject to persecution, torture or even murder that must be subject to the
rule of law, whilst with criminal matters, it is the potential risk to innocent
defendants of suffering incarceration or death. As both scenarios are clearly
analogous, the necessity of judicial review in such circumstances, and its effective
denial thereof, constitutes discrimination with potential horrendous ramifications.
Judicial review:  providing a right to an effective
remedy
As customary international law, Article 8 of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” Here a
nexus is created between the right to judicial review as an effective remedy, and
the protection of fundamental human rights. This approach is entirely compatible
with the theory of the separation of powers, with the independent judiciary as the
only adequate bulwark against tyranny, with access to the courts as a vital means
to by which to guard against violations of person liberty
Indeed, it is an approach that receives a widespread uniformity of practice by
States seeking to conform to democratic liberalism and the rule of law, and as a
protector of the vulnerable individuals against the powerful modern state.
Moreover, the development administrative law, firmly supports the facilitation of
judicial review over administrative determination, especially as a means to
facilitate redress for violations of human rights.53 As will be discussed below, in
Australia, the advent of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
exemplified the intention of the Legislature to revolutionise individual access to
judicial review. Against this backdrop, subsequent legislative restrictions on
grounds of appeal vis-à-vis the Migration Act, and its subsequent amendment,
must be regarded as nothing less than a discriminatory denial of equal access to
the vital remedy of judicial review in the most desperate of circumstances.
As a ‘competent authority,’ it is only the judiciary that has the capacity to grant
the potentially life saving remedies of habeas corpus, injunction, mandamus and
certiorari.54 Restrictions to the capacity of the judiciary to grant such remedies in
relation to refugee determination, it is argued, are therefore nothing less than a
flagrant breach of the jus cogens obligation of non-refoulement and the inter-
related prohibition of torture. Therefore, in light of the above, little lip service
should be given to suggestions that international law provides States with a carte
                                                
53 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional And Administrative Law, Cavendish Publishing, London,
1999 p 801
54 The Constitution of Australia, s 75: Not also that the ‘Judicature’ has the power of
certiorari by implication.
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blanche margin of appreciation over non-refoulement determination.55 Indeed,
what constitutes an effective remedy must be viewed in terms of the remedy
required, capacity, and for that matter the willingness of the competent authority
the grant the appropriate remedy. Notably, in Australia, human rights bodies have
repeatedly voiced their concerns over the non-reviewable and non-compellable
power of the Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs pursuant to the
Migration Act.56 Australian human rights bodies have voiced concerns in relation
to views exemplified by the following statement by the Attorney General’s
Department:57
The government does not need to legislate to regulate its own behaviour. The
government can simply undertake not to, and in fact not, refoul people. It is where
obligations are going to be imposed on citizens that it is likely to be necessary to
enact a law so that the government can impose those obligations on people
subject to its jurisdiction. Where the obligation is only on government, the
government can simply undertake to fulfil that obligation without any law to
compel it to do so.58
Without adequate judicial review, however, determination of such matters may be
regarded as merely an exercise of administrative power ‘by law,’ outside the
protection of the ‘rule of law,’ in total contravention of the ‘overarching principle.’
The application of the ‘overarching principle’
and the prohibition of refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement underpins the prohibition of torture by creating
an extra-territorial obligation that renders acts of refoulement tantamount to
positive violations. States that refoule (or expel) individuals to be persecuted, via
a domestic refugee determination process, violate the Refugee Convention, the
CAT and the ICCPR to the same degree as the persecutor. Article 7 of the
ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subject to torture or to cruel or degrading
treatment or punishment’. The Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence
articulates this negative obligation by emphasising that placing individuals in
another jurisdictions where there is a risk of torture is equivalent to a positive act
of torture itself.59
                                                
55 Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional and References Committee: Inquiry
into the Operation of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program (June 1999) p57. The
report suggested that Australia can implement non-refoulement any way it so choices.
56 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission to the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Committee inquiry into Australia’s refugee and humanitarian program
(May 1999)  p 9
57 Ibid; Graham Thom, Amnesty International Australia, Report,  2 / August / 2002
58 Senate Committee,  op cit., p 58: Transcript of evidence, Attorney-General’s Department,
pp. 221-222
59 General Comment 20, paragraph 9
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Inadequate implementation, for example, by virtue of poor refugee determination
procedures or unchecked humanitarian protection, cannot  under any
circumstances, justify violations of the prohibition of Torture.  As a well-codified
peremptory norm of international law, and one that is broadly accepted by
scholars as jus cogens,60 the prohibition of torture, furthermore, operates beyond
the scope of the Refugee Convention. Thus, the right of individuals to resist
expulsion is not necessarily dependent of satisfying Refugee Convention definition
of ‘refugee’. More broadly, Article 3 of the CAT provides that ‘[n]o State Party
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
suspected of torture.’ In light of the ambit of the prohibition of refoulement, the
application of the ‘overarching principle’ must extend beyond mere Convention
‘refugee’ determination, to include all forms of administrative decision making
determining non-refoulement including humanitarian discretion vested in
government ministers. It must be emphasised that judicial review of all such
administrative decisions must be regarded as vital to the effective implementation
of non-refoulement.
The scope of article 14 of the ICCPR - Resolving
perceptions of ambiguity, under the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties
At the outset, it should be emphasised that the author does not accept, in spite of
prevailing arguments to the contrary,61 that Article 14 of the ICCPR is inherently
ambiguous. Rather it was drafted with the necessary degree of malleability to
accommodate a diversity of determination processes and legal traditions.62Any
question of ambiguity, therefore, arises from unconscionable efforts of States that
would seek to promote a restrictive interpretation of the provision, contrary to
good faith.
                                                
60 Refer CAT and HRC , ECHR jurisprudence regarding implementation; David Kennedy
elaborates states that ‘the practice of non-refoulement has, over the last hundred years,
been transformed into the ‘principle  of non-refoulement’, which is seen by scholars as a
‘fundamental’ international legal obligation forming the cornerstone of refugee law. Of
course there are exceptions, and state practice, particularly as to opinio juris is anything but
conclusive. Nevertheless scholars continue to insist that the principle of non-refoulement
has become binding as a matter of both treaty and customary law if not also as a so-called
peremptory norm of jus cogens, ‘International Refugee Protection’, Human Rights
Quarterly, Volume 8, No.1, 1986, pp 57-65
61  P. Van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, p 392
62 The drafting of Art. 14 occurred regardless of the ideological divisions and differing legal
tradition in existence of the cold war period,. See Generally Nowak, op cit, pp XIX – XXI,
233-238
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The sources of international law contained in article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ
not only collectively serves to support the ‘overarching principle’, but also serve
to provide a contextual backdrop by which to remedy the perceived ambiguity of
article 14. The right to a fair hearing in criminal matters and matters in the
‘determination of rights and obligations at a suit at law’ has been codified by
article 14 in the following terms:
‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of
any charge against him, or his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.’
Whilst, article 14 facilitates misconceived perceptions of uncertainty by the words
‘rights and obligations at a suit at law’, jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights(ECtHR) concerning article 6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, can serve to remedy a lack of HRC
jurisprudence concerning article 14. As to the scope of application of the words
‘determination of his rights and obligations’, it may be concluded from ECtHR
jurisprudence that the vagueness of the term provides for creative interpretation
and judicial policy.63 While a strict literal interpretation may suggest confinement
to criminal and civil matters,64 such an approach, clearly runs contrary to article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which requires:
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of their scope
and purpose.’
An autonomous interpretation can moreover be facilitated with reference to the
object and purpose of the ‘overarching principle.’65 The kinds of rights covered
by the right to a fair hearing are indeed not dependent on the structure of
respective domestic legal systems. Rather, “the fact that the claim concerned was
addressed by national proceedings (i.e. performing administrative or judicial
refugee determination), constitutes sufficient grounds for the ‘arguability’ of the
existence of the right.”66 Thus, given that the right to a fair hearing before an
independent court is clearly premised on the necessity to protect individuals
against unjustifiable restrictions on life and liberty carried out by the state, it is
difficult to see how an autonomous meaning could not be afforded.
                                                
63 P. Van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, p 392
64 General Comment 13 does not provide guidance to the definition and ambit of the term
'rights and obligations at a suit at law.'
65 The term ”rights and obligation” should be given an autonomous meaning.  Nowak, op
cit, pp 242-243
66 Ibid., p 394
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Article 14 not only provides for the necessity of a tribunal independent from the
executive stream of government, but also, facilitates minimum guarantees,
underpinning and including the presumption of innocence in criminal matters.
Moreover the codification of the principle of equality before the courts, underpins,
more broadly, a purposive application of article 14.67 As a safe guard of personal
liberty the provision exemplifies an expression of international consensus of the
right to a fair and independent Tribunal based on the liberal tradition of the
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. As Nowak points
out, “[t]he wording and historical background of Article 14…demonstrates that
agreement was reached… on a provision based on liberal principles of the
separation of powers and independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
executive.68
Moreover, analogy can clearly be drawn from the way criminal prosecutions
attract an immediate right to be heard before an independent court pursuant to the
vast majority of criminal legislations. As an expression of liberalism, as with
criminal matters, the underlying purpose of article 14 impliedly facilitates non-
discriminative access to the courts in matters involving potential restrictions to
liberty. On this basis, the ‘overarching principle’ requires that administrative
decisions that seek to restrict the right to life, liberty and bodily integrity, or result
in human rights abuses amounting to persecution, should be subject to effective
judicial review.
State practice and the applicability of article 14
to administrative matters
The growth of administrative law is a relatively recent phenomenon. The influence
of the judiciary over administrative decision-making remained largely constrained
by the somewhat naive assumption that the doctrine of responsible government
was sufficient to check misgovernance.69 In the common law world, the
supremacy of parliament has thus remained the dominant structural characteristic
of the modern nation state.70
In Australia, it was not until 1976 with the advent of the new Federal Court that
judicial review of administrative decision-making at the Federal level was
adequately facilitated. Thus, in 1977, with the codification of the common law
grounds of appeal pursuant to the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review
                                                
67 Nowak, op cit, p 339
68 Ibid, 237
69 See Roger Douglas & Melinda Jones, Administrative law: Commentary & Materials,
Second Edition, Federation Press, 1996, p 30-31
70 See Hillarie Barnett, Constitutional And Administrative Law, Cavendish Publishing,
London, 1999,  207-259
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Act’s, a new order in Australian administrative law had emerged providing more
comprehensive redress for human rights grievances. Beyond the ‘original
jurisdiction’ of the High Court, refugee determination became reviewable for the
first time by the Federal Court. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, broad
judicial oversight of refugee matters prevailed until 1993 until the first of the
amendments restricting grounds of review under the Migration Act.71
This Australian ‘new order’ of effective judicial review over administrative
decision-making was arguably reflected by the need, not only in Australia, but
elsewhere, to protect individuals against an obvious unchecked margin of
discretion of government decision-making.72 In view of these considerations, it is
submitted that the express absence of administrative matters in article 14, should
not be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to preclude judicial review of matters
effecting human life and liberty. Rather it is indicative of the fact that, when the fair
trial provisions of article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
article of the 14 ICCPR were drafted,73 judicial review of administrative
determination was significantly less prevalent than it is today.74
Article 8 of the UDHR as evidence of customary international law provides for
“the right to an effective remedy by a competent national tribunal for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted …by the constitution or by law.” The Human
Rights Committee has indeed held that the “concept of a suit at law or its
equivalent in other language tests is based on the nature of the right in question
rather than on the status of one of the parties.”75Thus, whilst the existence of the
‘overarching principle’ is not dependent on its adequate codification under
international treaties, restrictive interpretations of article 14 should not be
permitted to suffice in the face of ample support for a correct and broad
interpretation. To suggest that somehow the principle does not extend to
administrative law borders on the absurd considering that refugee determination
systems throughout the developed world are more or less dependent upon
administrative determination processes for the implementation of non-
refoulement. Administrative law is, after all, in accordance with the liberal
tradition, not an exception to the checks and balances of the rule of law. To
                                                
71 Part VIII of the Migration Act restricts the range of people who are permitted to seek
judicial review in the Federal Court and restricts the ground on which the Federal Court can
review ‘judically-reviewable decisions.’
72 Douglas & Jones, op cit, p31; V Herman & J Hodge (1978), ‘The European Parliament and
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suggest that the underlying purpose of the right to a fair hearing, as a safe guard
against ‘tyranny’, does not apply to ‘everyone’ is nothing short of blatant
discrimination, especially when life, liberty and security are concerned. Indeed,
any interpretation that excludes refugee determination from the ambit of article 14
may be viewed as profoundly incompatible with the prohibition of non-
discrimination and the liberal principles on which the provision was based.
Interpretation of art 14 extended by analogy
Interpretation may also be supported, to varying degrees, on the customary
international law criteria of ‘widespread state practice’ and opinio juris76 and
supported further by ‘general principles of law’. Moreover article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, as an articulation of the sources of international law, should thus support
the ‘overarching principle’ at all four levels.77 It is however this reciprocal
interaction vis-à-vis the four sources of article 38 of the ICJ Statute that runs
contrary to a restrictive interpretation of Art 14.
It is against this back drop, it is argued, that misconstrued State perceptions of
shortfall or ambiguity regarding the extent of codification of the right to a fair and
effective hearing under article 14, can be precluded by analogy to matters
determining non-refoulement per se. This can be achieved with reference to a
common purpose to protect individuals against unwarranted restrictions on human
rights. Non-refoulement determination is, after all, as has been emphasised,
analogous to the determination of guilt or innocence in criminal proceedings.
Indeed, as the common purpose underlying both types of processes is to guard
against possible restrictions and violations of human rights including life and
liberty, in both contexts, and in accordance with the liberal democratic tradition,
the availability of effective judicial oversight must therefore be regarded as
mandatory to any determination process, be it criminal, administrative or
otherwise.  This would include all such matters that could potentially result in
serious restrictions to human rights.
In addition, the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent court
should not be confused with rights to appeal. Whilst it is understandable that
drawing comparisons with criminal procedure and administrative law can result in
some confusion, the question is not whether there is a right to appeal over refugee
determination, but rather, whether there is effective access to judicial review by a
court within the judicial stream at first instance. In Australia, once the Federal
Court has jurisdiction over an administrative matter, appeal processes eventuate
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by virtue of the courts seizure of the matter. This process must be distinguished
from criminal and civil matters that attract judicial review at a very early stage in
the procedural structure usually close after and subsequent to the initiation of
criminal prosecution or civil litigation. The question therefore is not whether there
is an avenue for appeal to an independent court, but rather, whether adequate and
affective judicial oversight is available per se.
Defining the broader context
In General Comment 13 on Article 14, the Human Rights Committee (HRC)
refrain from giving guidance as to the scope and purpose of ‘rights and obligations
at a suit at law’, except to say that ‘reports of States fail to recognise that article
14 applies not only to …the determination of criminal charges … but also to
procedures to determine their rights and obligations in a suit at law.’ In the light of
poor jurisprudence regarding the ambit of  ‘rights and obligations in a suit at law’,
a purposive interpretation conducted in good faith should suffice to ensure judicial
review over administrative matters do not preclude matters relating to non-
refoulement.
Moreover, assessing the ambit of the scope and purpose of Article 14 involves a
‘good faith’ interpretation with reference to ‘customary international law’ and
supported by ‘general principles of law.’ Norms that make up the broader
context must therefore include the non-derogatable peremptory norms of non-
discrimination and equality under the law. It is here that an interaction exists
between the sources of ‘international conventions’ ‘customary international law’
and ‘principles of laws of civilised nations’. Indeed, the two latter sources can
serve to rectify any ambiguity in the former. Importantly, reference to article 31 of
VCLT serves to short-circuit justifications for prevailing relativist approaches that
clearly discriminate against asylum seekers in breach of the ‘overarching
principle.’
Fair trail provisions must also provide equal protection to ‘all individuals’ within
the jurisdiction of the State regardless of the individual’s civil or political status.78
No human being residing within a territorial jurisdiction (citizen and non-citizen
alike) should be discriminated against regarding the right to a fair hearing.
Furthermore, although article 14 of the ICCPR does not expressly provide for
judicial review over all sorts of administrative decisions, it does not necessarily
preclude it. Regardless of its limitation, Art 14 provides codified evidence of the
general principle as it applies to civil and criminal matters, and in doing so,
evidences the obligation to afford adequate and effective judicial oversight to all
effected individuals over matters restricting life and liberty. The wide spread
growth of general adherence of domestic legal systems to the tradition of general
                                                
78 Art. 2 ICCPR
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principles of natural or fundamental justice in administrative law,79is indicative of
such obligatory conduct.
                                                
79 The Rise of administrative law principle correlates with the growth of the executive
government and the modern nation state.  See generally, Douglas and Jones, op cit, pp 28-
54
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7 The domestic context
Scope of comparative analysis
With Australia in focus, an examination will suffice with reference to the
jurisprudence of the High Court, the Federal Court, and to a lesser extent the
administrative reasoning of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). Furthermore, in
broader support of the ‘overarching principle,’ comparisons will be made with
other jurisdictions in both common law and civil law jurisdictions where
necessary. The scope of the ‘overarching principle’, as supported by ‘customary
international law’ and as ‘general principles of law,’ is thus evidenced by
interconnecting colorations and common practices identifiable throughout the
common law and civil law world. Hence, it is possible to derive material evidence
in support the ‘overarching principle’ from various sources.
Comparisons will be made with, but not limited to, Canada, the United Kingdom
and Sweden. Although, if word length had permitted, other jurisdictions of both
the Roman law and common law traditions might be utilised. More specifically,
reference to the Canadian context, will enable a comparative assessment of the
operation of the ‘overarching principle’ within the context of Australian
constitutionalism and the rule of law. For example, conclusions will be drawn
regarding the absence, in Australia, of constitutionally entrenched human rights
and how this effects, or, more accurately, limits judicial power. Specifically, the
jurisprudence of the superior courts will be examined within the context of the rule
of law and the liberal tradition of the separation of powers.
Essentially, the comparative aspect of this paper is made easier by the fact that
administrative law regimes dealt with (and for that matter most others) are, to
varying degrees throughout developed civil law and common law world, similar in
substance if not in form. As H. Patrick Glen rightly suggests, convergence in legal
tradition not only exists within common and civil law jurisdictions within the
European context, but indeed elsewhere.80 Nowhere are such similarities more
prevalent than in countries with the separation of judicial power and the rule of
law. To understand the basics of Indonesian administrative law, for example (in
the context of a civil law jurisdiction in democratic deficit), one could do well to
open a book on Australian administrative law (operating within the context of a
common law tradition under representative democracy and a comparatively
independent judiciary).81 Notably, principles or practices of judicial review,
                                                
80 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.,
p239
81 The Indonesian legal system is characterised by a strong tradition of administrative law,
based on the European tradition.
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including procedural fairness and the doctrine of ultra vires exemplify such
similarities.
The traditional role of the court as the welder and protector of judicial power will
thus be examined in the light of ongoing legislative initiatives to restrict judicial
oversight over refugee determination. Suffice to say, the purpose of evaluating the
powers of judicial review over refugee determination is considered essential to the
formulation of a coherent assessment of the strength of the judiciary’s adherence
to the ‘overarching principle’ as opinio juris. In other words, to determine the
judiciary’s psychological commitment to the facilitation of broad and effective
judicial oversight, and as a prerequisite fro the implementation of non-
refoulement, it is essential that the jurisdictional limits and the legal context in
which judicial power is exercised is adequately assessed.
The Rule of Law and judicial review
In accordance with liberalism, the separation of powers as the only known viable
means of ensuring the rule of law; and as a bulwark against tyranny, requires that
decisions effecting the most fundamental of human rights must, as a matter of
priority, be subject to real and effective judicial oversight. As such, this approach
is exemplified by the vast majority of criminal processes though out the world.
Without judicial review, such decisions would remain outside the ambit of the rule
of law, void of check or balance.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to devise a viable alternative to first
instance administrative determination of non-refoulement, the inadequacy of
judicial review over administrative decision-making must be emphasised. It is
against this backdrop that the tension between, firstly, the judiciary as a protector
of the rule of law, and secondly, the judiciary as a protector of human rights can
be best understood. The independence of the judiciary, as a protector of liberty,
is rightly regarded as a prerequisite for ensuring the effective implementation of the
rule of law as the ultimate governing structure under which the legislature, the
executive and even the judiciary itself is answerable.82 Lord Steyn aptly states the
necessity that:
                                                
82 The essence of the rule of law is that of the sovereignty or supremacy of law over man.
The rule of law insists that every person – irrespective of rank or status in society – be
subject to the law. For the citizen, the rule of law is both prescriptive – dictating the conduct
required by law – and protective of citizens – demanding that the government acts
according to law. . The concept is of great antiquity and continues to exercise legal and
political philosophers today. See Barnett, op cit., p87
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the judiciary accept a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that
embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance
behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law.83
In accordance with obligations integral to the separation of judicial power and the
rule of law, judicial mandate is thus defined by its very purpose. That is, as a
constitutional bulwark against the potential tyranny of the legislature and
executive, the legitimate mandate of the judiciary, even in the absence of a bill of
rights, it is suggested, extents by implication as the guardian of liberty and to the
facilitation of human rights. More specifically, the principle of equality before the
law can be regarded as integral as an underlying purpose of the democratic
system of government.84
As a bulwark against tyranny and totalitarianism, the Separation of Powers
between the judiciary and the legislature prevails as a fundamental and an
unequivocally necessary aspect of the modern democratic state.85 As a
constitutional structure, the separation of powers not only serves to facilitate the
rule of law; it also is fundamental to the protection and implementation of human
rights at domestic level.86 Indeed, without an independent judiciary, the domestic
implementation of human rights remains utterly dependent on the whims of
executive and legislative discretion.
Furthermore, the scope judicial power, must therefore be sufficiently broad and
effective to enable the judiciary to check legislative and executive power.
Adequate judicial oversight of administrative decision-making conforms to the
orthodox liberal tradition of the rule of law. Moreover, as a tradition that requires
non-discrimination and equality before the law, reflected by wide spread
democratic values, liberalism enjoys global acceptance underpinned by the
International Bill of Rights,87 evidenced by widespread domestic constitutional
codification,88 and reinforced by the peremptory norm of non-discrimination.89 As
integral to a modern democratic civil society, superior court jurisprudence, now
                                                
83 Sir William Wade, Administrative Law: Eighth Edition, Oxford University press, 2000.,p 23:
Rv Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court ex p. Bennet [1994] 1 AC 42 at 62
84 See generally., Ibid. pp 20-25
85 In conformity with the Anglo-American system of government, the Australian
Constitutional Model is characterised by a relatively separate judiciary.
86 Sir William Wade, op cit. p 23
87 The International Bill of Rights constitutes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
88 In most countries where the rule of law predominates, excluding Australia, Human rights
are constitutionally entrenched.
89 While the UDHR is not a binding instrument, as a resolution of the General assembly of
the United Nations constituting broad international consensus, and to the extent of
codification by the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it constitutes custom.
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more than ever, whether in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada,
emphasises the facilitation of interests and rights of vulnerable groups and
individuals including asylum seekers.
As will be examined below, the Australian High Court, in the absence of a
constitutional Bill of rights, has exhibited a propensity for applying common law
rights even when faced with contrary legislative intention. In the context of modern
liberalism, nineteenth century utilitarianism can no longer be regarded as
compatible with contemporary notions of good governance. Utterly at odds with
the prevalence of fundamental human rights, indeed, the maxim, ‘the greatest
good for the greatest number’ has lost all credence within a contemporary
democratic paradigm. With respect to the influence that international human rights
should have on Australian Constitutionalism, even in the face of poor domestic
implementation, Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia suggests, “that it [is]
appropriate for judges to favour the construction which would conform to the
principles of universal and fundamental rights rather than an interpretation which
would involve a departure from such rights.”90
However, in the context of a dualist discourse, and when faced with the
inadequacies of poor domestic implementation in the absence of a bill of rights, it
remains to be seen whether the Australian High Court will break its traditionalist
shackles, and exercise judicial power to the extent that personal liberty demands.
But, as will be discussed below, much depends on the judiciary’s preparedness
on occasion to step on the sovereign toes of the legislature. Just maybe, if it so
chooses, the judiciary may discover the Parliament’s Diceyan skin is tougher than
it thinks.91
Judicial review of refugee determintion –
Australia in focus
The inadequacy of unchecked administrative tribunals
The inadequacy of domestic administrative refugee determination systems is far-
reaching and immeasurable. However, even though the quality of superior court
jurisprudence has lacked a consistency of reasoning, and exhibited a propensity
for parochialism,92 the adherence of independent courts to the administration of
justice has, in comparison, thus far been undeniably, and with variable exceptions,
                                                
90 Justice Kirby, Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Norms – [1999]
AJHR 27; http//www.austlii.edu.au/journals/AJHR/199927.html. p 9
91 Dicey’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty purported that a court of law was not entitled
to rule against or question the validity the parliaments enactments. In a constitutional sense,
this is a strict form of parliamentary sovereignty., See Barnett, op cit,  p5
92 See generally, Crawley, op cit
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vastly superior than the politicised reasoning of tribunals93. Clearly administrative
tribunals exhibit a parochial tendency to devalue the credibility if applicants
prematurely and unreasonably on the basis of apparent inconsistent testimony.94
Moreover, as will be illustrated, unchecked decision makers and administrative
tribunals have exhibited a propensity for unreasonableness and parochialism.95
As an administrative tribunal, the RRT operates as a quasi-inquisitorial body
empowered to conduct merits review of refugee applications, under the
Migration Act, on appeal from an individual decision-maker.96  Although refugee
issues are legally complex, nevertheless, there is no requirement that RRT
members have legal training97. Nor is there a right of applicants to be granted legal
representation.98 Furthermore, members are not independent of the executive in a
real sense.
Indicative of poor decision-making, there has been numerous complaints of bias
directed at the members.99 As appointments are based on term contracts, RRT
members may appropriately be regarded a foot servants of the government.100 In
further erosion of RRT independence, the Minister of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs has evened threatened, on occasion, non-renewal of
employment contracts if members should decide to depart from a restrictive
interpretation of the definition of refugee.101 The poor quality of the RRT’s
decision-making over the years is therefore undoubtedly consequential to clearly
identifiable systemic and fundamental inadequacies. Indeed, the performance and
                                                
93 For example, Minority Bosnians Decision, Swedish Aliens Appeals Board (AAB)
exhibited incompetence regarding Sweden’s non-refoulement obligations within the context
of the European Union, UD98/780/MP; Gregor Noll, ‘Formalism v Empiricism: Some
reflections on the Dublin Convention on the Occasion of Recent European Case Law,’
Nordic Journal of International Law 70, pp 166-167.
94 See, for example, Abebe (1999) 162 ALR 1,  Here it is noted that the RRT disbelieved the
applicants account of events merely on the basis of inconsistencies, drawing negative
inferences from corroborating evidence. The Tribunal refused to consider the applicant’s
submission as credible in spite of a report from Amnesty International objectively
supporting the submission. In denying the appeal, the High Court however commented that
that RRT’s decision was a decision that could not have been made by a reasonable decision
maker.
95 See, for example, Eshetu v Minister or Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 142 ALR:
96 See generally, ss152-179 Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
97 The RRT has stated that 29 out of 52 members have law degrees: See Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee, Operation of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian
Program, 20 July 1999, 72
98 See ss425 and 427 (6) Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
99 See Susan Kneebone, ‘The Refugee Review Tribunal and the Assessment of Credibility:
An inquisitorial role? (1998) 5 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 78
100 Mary E Crock. Case Note: Abebe v Commonwealth; Minister v Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu: Of Fortress Australia and Castles in the Air: The High Court
and the Judicial Review of Migration Decisions, 24 Melbourne University Law Review 190,
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101  See Mary Crock, op cit, p213
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reasoning of the RRT is all the more problematic considering its mandate requires
conformity to ‘substantial justice’ and the merits of the case.102
The superiority of Judicial Reasoning
Australian High Court and Federal Court jurisprudence serves to exemplify this
disparity between, what this writer considers to be, real judicial jurisprudence,
and the administrative reasoning of Government decision makers and
administrative tribunals. In the Chan case,103 the High Court of Australia held that
the concept of ‘well-founded fear’ contains both a subjective and an objective
element. In contrast to the RRT, their honours thus took a balanced approach in
accordance with UNHCR recommendations, and furthermore purported that
objective assessment should be determined on the basis of a ‘real chance’ test.
It is however of some concern, that the High Court of Australia poorly impacts on
administrative decision-making process due to an unduly restrictive jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for asylum seekers, domestic superior court jurisprudence
supporting an eradication of a real or substantial risk of persecution, fails to
impact refugee determination though out the administrative determination process.
As Heaven Crawley suggests, similarly in the United Kingdom, parochialism
permeates the decision- making process from top to bottom.104
In Sweden, where there is no right of judicial review over refugee determination
per se, the risk of refoulement is stemmed by the provision of residual
humanitarian protection fully dependent on the good will of the executive. In spite
of recent of parliamentary debate proposing legislative change to provide for
judicial review, it is nevertheless markedly problematic that Sweden’s regime of
protection against refoulement exists entirely within the executive stream of
government, utterly dependent on humanitarian goodwill and subject to the whims
of political expediency. As Hathaway succinctly puts it, “the purely administrative
quality of these substitute classifications (as with Sweden) sometimes places
refugee protection at the mercy of the potentially capricious discretion of states.105
Over-reliance on residual protection, and under-reliance on codified standards of
non-refoulement, arguably sets a dangerous precedent that could potentially
                                                
102 Migration Act s 420(2) (b); It should be noted, however, in 1992, an Explanatory
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103 Chan (1989) 169 CLR 379
104 See generally, Heaven Crawley, ‘Reconciling universal human rights and cultural
relativism’, in Refugees and Gender: Law and Process, Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 2001,
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105 James C. Hathaway and John A. Dent, Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative Survey,
York Lanes Press, Toronto, 1995, PP. 5-17 in B.S. Chindi, International Refugee Law: A
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undermines the legitimacy of the principle of non-refoulement. It is reasonable to
suggest that the Swedish approach may also serve to give credence to relativist
arguments promoting unjustifiable departure from international legal obligation
which reference to widespread practice. Sweden should therefore be cautious of
providing unscrupulous governments with the ‘green light’ to further violate their
obligations. Moreover, the Swedish approach operates at a time when
Conservative governments in the developed world exhibit a propensity to depart
from legal obligations under international human rights treaties. It is therefore
worth bearing in mind, in jurisdictions like Australia, where the Refugee
Convention provides the only available effective means of protection against
refoulement, under Australian Domestic law, there is no effective implementation
of the obligation of non-refoulement under the CAT nor the ICCPR. The only
meagre mechanism for humanitarian protection is provided for pursuant to section
417(1) of the Migration Act which gives the Minister of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs the discretion to provide protection to applicants who are
denied refugee status under the Act. As section 417(1) is not subject to judicial
review, those seeking humanitarian protection remain at the mercy of
unsympathetic politicians.
The jurisdiction of the Australian High court and
Federal Court defined
In light of these considerations, it is necessary to examine, in more detail, the
extent of judicial review over refugee determination in Australia. The Australian
Constitution, pursuant to Section 75(v), provides the High Court of Australia with
‘original jurisdiction’ [i]n all matters…(i) arising under any treaty [and]…(v) in
which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an
officer of the commonwealth…’ As an entrenched constitutional provision, the
‘original jurisdiction’ cannot be abrogated by the parliament. Although the High
Court has the entrenched jurisdiction to exercise judicial review over
administrative decisions, its mandate does not however extend beyond the realm
of judicial power. Thus, in accordance with the separation of powers set out by
the Constitution, the High Court cannot exercise executive power. Rather, its
jurisdiction is confined to enforcing the law. As will be illustrated, however, the
extent to which the judiciary exhibit a propensity for activism is subject to the
fundamental constraints of constitutionalism.
The Federal Court of Australia, on the other hand, does not have a direct
constitutional basis. Rather, pursuant to Section 77 of the Constitution, the
Federal Court was created in 1976 by an Act of Parliament to alleviate the High
Court’s unmanageable workload, thereby revolutionising Australian administrative
law by providing aggrieved persons with effective access to judicial review. The
weaknesses of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, however, is that without an
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‘original jurisdiction’ the scope of judicial review remains susceptible to restrictive
legislation. Thus, whenever the High Court decides to remit a matter back to the
Federal Court,106 the scope of judicial review is limited by the Migration Act.
The practice of judicial self restriant
The High Court of Australia has exhibited willingness to protect its own
independence seemingly at all costs.107 Understandably, and in accordance with
the Anglo-legal tradition, the judiciary holds firm in its reluctance to impinge upon
the sovereignty of Parliament.108 Moreover, the High Courts reluctance to spread
its jurisdictional wings by either implying rights from the constitution or
progressively reading down ousting legislation, must therefore be viewed in terms
of their honours adherence a rule of law.
Nevertheless, as such, this reluctance, or arguably inability, to enforce human
rights does not undermine opinio juris but is rather indicative of the legislatures
inability to restrict, in a practical sense at least, the court’s jurisdiction. In the
absence of a Bill of Rights, the High court as the repository of judicial power
exercises judicial restraint in conformity with its Constitutional mandate.
Moreover, such restraint is of course vital to sustaining consistency and continuity
of its legitimacy. The High Courts traditional adherence to doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty has not  however, in recent years, precluded the
exercise of judicial power as an inescapable duty. In Australian Capital
Television Pty LTD  v Commonwealth,109 the High Court, for the first time,
implied the right of political discussion from the Constitution. As a milestone for
Australian human rights law, the right of political discussion was held to be a
fundamental prerequisite for the facilitation of responsible government under the
Constitution.  Mason CJ stated that “where the implication is structural rather than
textual it is no doubt correct to say that the term sought to be implied must be
logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the
structure.”110 It was thus the indispensability of the freedom of communication to
the operation of responsible government and representative democracy that
necessitated the protection of the right. The maintenance of an identifiable right
vital to the operation of Australian constitutional democracy, it may be argued,
has thus established a precedent by which other rights might be implied to
necessitate democracy. On the basis of Australian Capital Television, it is
suggested that their honours are now free to exercise their legitimate jurisdiction to
protect other rights integral to the democratic society, for which the Constitution
                                                
106 Section 44 Judiciary Act 1903
107 Even when faced with profound unreasonableness, the High Court and Federal Court will
refrain from impinging on clear legislative intention. See  Abede v Commonwealth and
Minister For Immigration (1992) 177 CLR 106
108 See, Crock, op cit, pp 214-215
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was designed. It is argued, therefore, this should include the right to adequate and
effective judicial review over administrative decisions determining non-
refoulement.
Together with the doctrine the responsible government, the independence of a
judicially is integral to democracy. To reiterate, the grand purpose of the judiciary
is after all to provide a bulwark against ‘tyranny,’ which must logically include acts
of refoulement.111 It remains to be seen, however, whether the High Court will
be willing, if able, to exercise judicial power as a protector of modern
constitutional democracy - not merely utilitarian in its underpinning – for the
benefit of ‘everyone’ residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth. As will be illustrated below, it is somewhat that the High Court
has remained resilient in its refusal to exercise its original jurisdiction as a curial
function in the protection of asylum seekers.
Abebe and Eshetu – opinio juris without jurisdiction
The 1999 High Court cases of Abede v Commonwealth and Minister For
Immigration112 and Multicultural affairs v Eshetu113 serve to exemplify the
reluctance of the judiciary to exercise its ‘original jurisdiction’ in the face of
legislative restrictions to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court when faced with
obvious fundamental flaws in the decision-making of the RRT.
In Abebe, an application by an Ethiopian Women was denied refugee status on
the basis of lacking credibility owing to the inconsistencies between subsequent
interviews. Various members of the High Court expressed concern over
assumptions made by the RRT that lying was indicative of the bona fides of the
applicant. In criticism of the RRT and in appreciation of the plight of refugees,
their honours pointed out that lying could also be indicative of the desperation
resulting from the fear of being sent back to the country of origin to face
persecution.114
Notably, in both cases the RRT received harsh criticism for parochial and
unreasonable decision-making, both by the Federal Court and to a lesser extent
by the High Court. In the Federal Court at first instance, Hill J stated:
So zealously does the Australian Parliament desire to implement its United
Nations treaty obligations to assist refugees, that it has enacted legislation
                                                
111 Definitions of ‘Tyranny’ include: arbitrary or unrestrained exercise of power; despotic
abuse of authority; undue severity or harshness; to exercise absolute power or control
cruelly or oppressively, see Webster’s Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language, Random House, New York, 1994
112 (1999) 162 ALR 1
113 (1999) 162 ALR 577
114 Ibid, p 208
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specifically to ensure that it is acceptable for a decision on refugee status to be
made by a tribunal which not only denies natural justice to an applicant, but also is,
so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could ever make it. 115
Regardless of evident concerns regarding the competence of the RRT, the High
Court dismissed both appeals on the basis that there was held to be no error of
law, therefore declining to exercise a jurisdiction that went beyond the prime
facie restrictions contained Part 8 of the Migration Act. In refusing to exercised
it jurisdiction, however, the Court expressed its concern that such legislative
restrictions on the Federal Court would inevitably eventuate in an unmanageable
appeals under the High Court’s ‘original jurisdiction.’
In support of the ‘overarching principle’, both cases represent a clear willingness
of the judiciary to express its concerns over the inadequacies of judicial oversight.
The significance of such judicial criticism is all the more obvious considering the
High Court traditional refusal, on constitutional grounds, to give advisory opinions,
even when the Parliament has attempted to give it such powers.116 Although the
Judiciary’s refusal to exercise its curial function under s 75 of the Constitution is a
matter of concern for advocates of the right to a fair trail, nevertheless, by
speaking out against the inadequacies of unchecked and inadequate decision
making, their honour provide strong material evidence of ‘opinio juris’ in support
of the overarching principle.
In the absence of a bill of rights
On numerous occasions the courts have exhibited obvious frustration about the
inadequacy of judicial oversight over decisions of the RRT. Frustrated by its
overly restricted jurisdiction, and its inability to implement international law, in
2000, the Federal Court when declining to exercise jurisdiction beyond an ‘error
of law’ stated:
‘The fact that it is the direct parliamentary intention… to pursue the most curious
course of ensuring that this Court cannot interfere, even where a decision is so
unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could reach it, where the
decision is based on irrelevant considerations, is affected by ostensible bias or
reached even where there is a denial of natural justice is hard to accept in what
one would like to think of as a liberal democracy, let alone one which had
committed itself to the international obligations to refugees reflected in the United
Nations Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’117
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bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2000/1088
41
Alternatively, however, it may be argued that the traditional approach of the
judiciary to avoid making decisions on the merits, even if the legislature have
confined the court jurisdiction to errors of law, is somewhat problematic. In
reality, it is not always easy to draw a boundary between merits review and
judicial review.118 Judicial analysis of questions of law are, after all, inseparable
from their factual context. Thus, if the assessment of the merits is integral the court
exercising its legitimate jurisdiction over questions of law, then, so be it. For it is
one thing to conform to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, but it is
something else for a constitutionally independent court to decline to fulfil its
judicial mandate based merely of theoretical concerns related to usurping of
legislative power.
It is rather ironic that the High Court limits its legitimate constitutional jurisdiction,
in order to achieve absolute conformity to the theory of the separation of powers.
After all, the High Court’s jurisdiction is dependent on its ability to protect and
exercise it jurisdiction, regardless of a degree of unavoidable overlap with the
executive and legislative stream of government. It is argued therefore that the
obvious remedy to ensure substantial conformity to the ‘overarching principle’ is
arguably the introduction of constitutionally entrenched rights. In the absence of a
bill of rights, it seems, unless the judiciary radically revisits its constitutional role as
a protector of liberty, judicial oversight will continue to remain susceptible to
contrary legislative intention.
A Constitutional prescription – the Canadian model
Although far from perfect, judicial review over refugee determination in Canada is
markedly superior to that of Australia. In Canada the initial screening process is
carried out by senior administrative officers acting administratively. Pursuant to
specific criterion, applicants found not to be admissible are immediately denied
access to the determination system and are issued a conditional removal order.119
Whilst there is the right to judicial  review of such decisions, applicants can
technically be deported while awaiting appeal after seven days.120 Nevertheless,
the grounds for judicial review under the Federal Court Act, are relatively
comprehensive and broad sweeping. They require that a decision-maker:
- acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction;
                                                
118 See Roger Douglas & Melinda Jones, Administrative Law, Commentary and Materials,
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119 Canadian Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch: Canada’s Refugee
Determination System, Margaret Young, July 1993/ Revised 2000
120 Ibid; Note also, all questions for leave to apply for judicial review are decided by one
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- failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other
procedure that it was required by law to observe;
- erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error of law
appears on the face of the record;
- based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made a perverse
or capricious manner or without regard to the material before it;
- acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
- acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
In simple terms, the judicial oversight of the Federal Court of Canada over
administrative refugee determination, unlike Australia, extends well beyond the
grounds of ‘illegality’ and bias to include a gamete of grounds under the rubric of
natural justice.
With the inclusion of entrenched constitutional rights in Canada, the Canadian
Supreme Court has now become empowered with the constitutional mandate to
override contrary legislative intention restricting judicial oversight of refugee
determination. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms serves to support
the ‘overarching principle’ in several ways. It clearly provides coverage to non-
citizen owing to its reference to ‘equality to the law’ thereby codifying the
common law principle at a constitutional level.121 Section 7 of the Charter states:
“ Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.”
In the Singh case,122 the Supreme Court of Canada held that ‘everyone’ refers to
every human being present in the territorial jurisdiction of Canada. This meant
section 7 would apply to citizens and non-citizens alike. Furthermore by equating
‘fundamental’ justice with ‘natural justice’ their honours rendered the common
law components of judicial review (both legally and procedurally) immune from
legislative restrictions.
As an exemplification of the superiority of judicial reasoning in the recent
Canadian High Court decision of Suresh v Canada,123for example, which
determined the applicability of prime facie refugee status to an applicant
reasonably suspected of terrorist affiliations in his country of origin (Sri Lanka),
their honours emphasised:
“…the need to ensure that those legal tools [exclusion clauses] do not undermine
values that are fundamental to our democratic society – liberty, the rule of law,
and the principles of fundamental justice – values that lie at the heart of the
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Canadian constitutional order and the international instruments that Canada has
signed.”124
Unaffected by the trappings of utilitarianism, their honours acknowledge ‘the
principles of fundamental justice’ are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal
system’.125Their honours commit to what they believe to be the deeply entrenched
‘Canadian’ values of liberalism, democracy and justice. The fundamental rights of
the human being, as fundamental to democratic society, are thereby held beyond
reproach. Here, ‘fundamental justice’, beyond its constitutional entrenchment,126is
regarded as fundamentally integral to the effective implementation non-
refoulement. By drawing on the monist school of thought,127their honours allude
to an inter-face between international human rights norms and the Canadian legal
principles of fundamental justice128thereby reinforcing the implementation of non-
refoulement as a non-derogatable State obligation. In Canada, in stark contrast
to Australia, refugee determination is therefore subject a relatively broad scope of
judicial oversight and reinforced by an entrenched bill of rights.
The High Court of Australia’s strict conformity to the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, on the other hand, in the absence of a constitutionally entrenched bill
of right creates a constitutional dilemma, ensuring a deficit of adherence to the
‘overarching principle’. As for the Canadian experience, an entrenched bill of
rights protects against the Legislature’s propensity to discriminate against non-
citizens in breach of the ‘overarching principle.’.
The current scope of judicial review under the
Migration Act
The facilitation of refugee determination under administrative law should not
undermine the applicability and necessity of judicial review.  In a democratic
context, even the most utopian liberal ideologies must at some stage give way to
the real and unavoidable pressures of limited judicial resources. Nation States,
after all, cannot be expected to provide individuals within their jurisdiction with an
unrestrained right of judicial review for every sort of conceivable claim.129 Today,
it is indeed common practice and acceptable that judicial review of administrative
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decisions be limited to declaring and enforcing the law in most instances.130
Nevertheless, the liberal administrative law tradition still requires that adequate
effective judicial oversight should suffice.
A determination of the adequacy of judicial oversight is thus unavoidably
dependent upon the type of decision under review. In common law countries such
as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, to varying degrees, it is common
practice for the legislature to limit, to varying degrees, the jurisdiction of the
courts.131 The prime facie preclusion of merits review from the jurisdiction of the
Court has also come to be widely regarded as an acceptable concession
necessary to restrict an over burdensome caseload, and to protect the
functionality of rule of law. To ensure the functionality of the judicial system, the
prioritisation of administrative matters, logically, now prevails so as to ensure a
maximum utilisation of judicial resources.
Such considerations must therefore suffice in order to establish the content and
scope of a well established general principle, one which, as will be discussed
below, is at least impliedly acknowledged if not practiced by the vast majority of
nation-states. To reiterate, the application of the ‘overarching principle’
guarantees adequate and effective judicial oversight over decisions that seek to
restrict, or potentially result in restrictions to the right to life and liberty, or violate
human rights violations amounting to persecution. A prioritisation of matters
should therefore suffice concerning human rights in conformity with the
‘overarching principle.’ Within this context, it is argued that refugee determination
and decisions determining the prohibition of refoulement, per se, should attract
priority status so as to attract the provision of adequate and effective judicial
review. It should be emphasised, for the most part, responsibility lies with the
Legislature to ensure that the courts retain adequate jurisdiction to adjudicate on
the facilitation and implementation of human rights. Alternatively, the courts are
responsible only to the extent that they restrictively exercise their jurisdiction.
The Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act  and the
codification  of natural justice / procedural fairness as
opinio juris
The central component of the common law doctrine of natural justice or
procedural fairness is the right to be heard. A right to a fair hearing before an
independent and impartial body may be regarded as integral to the facilitation of
such a right and consistent with the liberal tradition of the rule of law. Without
adequate review including merits, reasonableness and natural justice, of which are
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dependent on the individual’s ability to be heard, justice cannot be guaranteed.
The provision of natural justice is thus dependent on the capacity of the judiciary
to oversee its provision.
As explained above, the ADJR Act was enacted to codify the common law
grounds for judicial review and strengthen the jurisdiction of the Federal Court
over all kinds of administrative decisions.
The grounds pursuant to Section 5 of the Act include:
- breach of the rules of natural justice;
- procedures not observed required by law;
- the decision maker act out side their jurisdiction;
- improper purpose;
- error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the
decision;
- no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.
It is here that the inadequacy of judicial oversight may then be measured with
reference to the extent to which non-citizen fail to receive the essential protection
of natural or substantive justice and procedural fairness. Indeed, the extent to
which asylum-seekers are denied judicial review beyond a mere ‘error of law’
pursuant to part 8 of the Migration Act is indicative of the extent to which non-
citizens are discriminated against in breach of the ‘overarching principle.’
Although consensus regarding the extent of application of the common law
principle of natural justice remains unsettled, the jurisprudence of both the
Australian High Court and the Supreme Court of Canada while adhering prime
facie to the dualist school of thought and the necessity of domestic
implementation of international law, have both exhibited a tendency of utilising the
common law principle of non-discrimination, equality and procedural fairness in
the absence of parliamentary intention to the contrary. In Australia where the right
to a hearing lacks a constitutional basis, the presumption that individuals be
afforded rights of natural justice suggests a compromise by the judiciary.132 In
Kioa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, as a high water marks on
the applicability of procedural fairness, Mason J states:
The law has now developed to a point where …there is a duty to act fairly, in the sense of
according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights,
interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to a clear manifestation of contrary
intention133
The reluctance of the Australian High Court to restrict procedural fairness in the
absence of a clear contrary legislative intention, as stated above, is indicative of
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the judiciary’s adherence to parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of
powers. Importantly, both the and the Supreme Court of Canada, and to a lesser
extent that High Court of Australia, regard natural justice as equating fundamental
justice. Their Honours, for the most part, embrace natural justice as a fundamental
principle that does not owe its existence to the legislature.
Adherence to the ‘common law implication approach’ thus conforms to the
natural law school of thought to the extent that paramountcy is given to common
law human rights and values. In doing so, their honours provide material evidence
supporting opinion juris in support of the ‘overarching principle.’ Given the clear
contrary intention constituting discrimination in the denial of natural justice to non-
citizens under the Migration Act, it would be erroneous to suggest such
legislative initiatives constitute a ‘wide spread uniformity of practice’ under
customary international law. In the absence of a bill of rights, the jurisdiction of the
judiciary will always remain susceptible to the clear intent of the legislature, even if
such legislation is discriminative.
Alternatively, however, according to Susan Kneebone, by emphasising the citizen
/ non-citizen dichotomy in recognition of a supposed sovereign right of
government to exclude aliens arguably makes a demarcation that borders on
discrimination.134 For Kneebone it is problematic that the Australian High Court in
the midst of deep common law human rights tradition alludes to constitution
restriction to justify discrimination. Surely discrimination cannot, under any
circumstances be justifies upon the premise parliamentary sovereignty.
Nevertheless, in spite of the High Court’s somewhat regressive approach
regarding the application of natural justice, and while it is not a justification for
discrimination toward non-citizens, their honours’ reasoning is to some extent
understandable given prevailing jurisdictional constraints, amid a context of
representative democracy and a traditional adherence to dualism.
However, within a jurisprudential and constitutional tradition that espouses an
uncompromised adherence to the rule of law, the high Court jurisprudence it may
be argued exhibits an adherence to non-discrimination in the application of natural
justice although subject to the sovereignty of parliament. This approach must
nonetheless be regarded, even if unavoidable, as utilitarian in its underpinnings and
arguably does not sit well with a human rights based liberal tradition of democracy
which the High Court that has in recent decades claimed to adhere to. In all
fairness, however for the most part, it is not the High Court that has embraced
utilitarianism; but rather, it is the Parliament by way of restrictive legislation.
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Naturalism v Positivism - Implementation in deficit
A fundamental impediment to the implementation of international human rights is
the prevalence of dualism.135 The reality of dualism is that international law does
not become part of domestic law until it is implemented by legislation embodying
the substantive content of treaty obligations.136 Unquestionably, an inherent
ramification of dualism is that it perpetuates a deficit in implementation. Moreover
a significant domestic deficit in implementation prevails throughout the international
community. In this regard Australia is no exception.
In Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Teoh, which represents a
high watermark regarding the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations,’ the High Court
held that mere ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child constitutes
a public statement to the whole world.137 The effect of the decision was that even
without adequate legislative implementation, such a public statement created a
‘legitimate expectation’ that decisions makers would take into account as relevant
considerations, respective treaty obligations including the ‘best interests of the
child,’ In response to this decision, the Parliament with haste preceded to take
measures to oust the High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters by introducing the
Administrative Decisions (Effect of international Instruments)Bill 1997.138
In the midst such legislative measures limiting the ability of court to enforce human
rights, the Teoh case exemplifies the willingness of the judiciary to utilise common
law principle to facilitate human rights. By maintaining natural justice as an initial
entitlement, subject only to a clear contrary legislative intention, the judiciary
continues to place the onus on the legislature to initiate discriminative restrictions
on common law rights. On balance, clearly High Court jurisprudence favouring
the common law approach evidences opinio juris of the judiciary's recognition of
the common law right to natural justice and effective judicial oversight of
administrative decisions effecting human rights.
Within a dualist context, absent of a Bill of Rights, to suggest the Judiciary can
extend its judicial wings much more than it has already is questionable. Rather,
beyond an ‘original jurisdiction’, without a Bill of Rights the High Court can
exercise only a limited human rights jurisdiction that remains subject to legislative
intervention. As the cases alluded to above have illustrated, the judiciary has
already exhibited considerable ingenuity in the face of anti-human rights legislation.
Moreover, it should also always be emphasised, unlike their Canadian
counterparts, Australian Courts do not have the advantage of Article 7 of the
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to protect the right to natural or
‘fundamental justice.’ In the absence of an entrenched Bill of Rights, a progressive
human right-based approach as exemplified by the Teoh case, will always be
subsequently in danger of jurisdictional ousting by the parliament. It is
encouraging, however, that in spite of inadequate implementation, Justice Kirby
has advocated the judiciary’s utilisation of unincorporated norms of international
law by adhering to the Bangalore Principles to facilitate the unitisation of
incorporated norms which state, in effect:
1. International law (including human rights norms) is not, in most common
law countries, part of domestic law.
2. Such law does not become part of domestic law until Parliament so
enacts or judges (as another source of law-making) declare the norms
thereby established to be part of domestic law.
3. The judiciary will not do so automatically, simply because the norm is part
of international law or is mentioned in a treaty – even one ratified by their
own state
4. But if an issue of uncertainty arises (by a gap in the common law or
obscurity in its meaning or ambiguity in a relevant statute), a judge may
seek guidance in the general principles of law , as accepted by the
community of nations.
5. From this source material, the judge may ascertain and declare what the
relevant rule of domestic law is. It is the action of the judge, incorporating
the rule of law into domestic law, which takes part of domestic law.
What is especially significant about this approach is that it enables the judiciary to
look to international treats to interpret the scope and purpose of the implementing
legislation when dealing with ambiguities. This approach must therefore be
regarded as a significant shift from the strict dualism that has traditionally
precluded the judiciary, not just in Australia but elsewhere,139 from drawing upon
unincorporated international human rights norms.
The necessity of effective implementation by domestic legislation to give
substantive effect to international law, does not, however, sit well with natural law
theory. On the contrary, it arguably serves to provide support for positivism,
which is furthermore reflected in determination to the treatment of refugee issues
as mere migration control.140 As such, common law rights of natural justice, as has
been illustrated above, are being treated as norms, the legitimate origins of which,
lie with their positing by the state. This projection of instrumentalism conforms
with the notion that what legislation can giveth, legislation can taketh
away.141Within the domestic context, legal rights are therefore viewed as
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dependent on legislative grants with their availability dependent upon statutory
interpretation.142 From an international lawyer’s perspective with natural law
tendencies, the deficit between international obligations and domestic
implementation can however serve as a useful measuring stick to ascertain actual
shortfall of implementation by emphasising that the responsibility for
implementation rests, for the most part, firmly on the shoulders of the Legislature.
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Conclusion
Vagaries over the scope of codification of the ‘general overarching principle,’
under international law, clearly provides an excuse for widespread discriminative
legislation and policies excluding asylum seekers from equal protection under the
rule of law. Nevertheless, as a principle carrying the status of jus cogens, non-
discrimination renders such differential treatment, regardless of any uniformity and
generality of state practice, repugnant as a violation of a peremptory norm of
international human rights law. Consistent and widespread violations of
fundamental human rights cannot, therefore, must be continue to be seen for what
they are. It is therefore of profound concern, that regardless of the fundamental
ascendancy of international human rights law, States use the principle of
sovereignty as a justification to trump their human rights obligations. ‘Refugee
law,’ it is suggested, if viewed as a separate area of international law distorts the
status of asylum seekers as ‘human beings’ deserved, morally and legally, of the
full enjoyment and protection of international human rights law. The principle of
equality, it must be emphasised, is not a mere posited practice by the international
community. Rather it constitutes the very fabric on which civil society is based.
Beyond the limits placed on political participation, it is blatantly discriminative to
exclude non-citizens from the coverage of the rule of law, both at domestic and
international level. Indeed the right to a fair hearing before an independent court
ensures that ‘everyone’ within the territorial jurisdiction of the nation state is
treated equally under the rule of law. Thus in the absence of adequate judicial
oversight of decisions effecting restrictions and violations of human rights, such
guarantees cannot be adequately facilitated.
In sum, refugee and humanitarian determination systems though out the world
violate the ‘overarching principle,’ to varying degrees, rendering the prohibition of
refoulement substantially ineffective for the vast majority of refugee applicants.
The degree to which asylum seekers are denied access to adequate refugee
determination systems, subject to the rule of law, is therefore indicative of the
extent to which States violate the ‘overarching principle’. In developed nations,
with the capacity and resources to ensure effective implementation of non-
refoulement, and where the rule of law predominates, the right to judicial review
is being squeezed like an old accordion, with its ability to play the tune of justice,
liberal tolerance and inclusion severely stunted by legislative intervention in
violation of the most fundamental of human rights.
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